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Abstract:
Beginning in the early 20th century, and culminating at the Bandung conference in 1955, the
Third World began to consolidate itself as an international bloc around a philosophy of self
rule and international solidarity. Cameroon’s Union des Populations the Cameroun (UPC)
embraced this project from its inception, and maintained a strong internationalist agenda
throughout its existence as it struggled for Cameroon’s independence, first from French
trusteeship, and then from what was, in its view, an illegitimate neo-colonial government.
International solidarity was not merely a rhetorical tool for the UPC, but was rather an
essential part of their strategy to achieve their national goals. The party attempted to put the
objectives of Third World solidarity in to practice through a number of projects, most notably
in the cultivation of personal and political relationships between the party’s elite and
emerging Third World Leaders, and educational and military exchange. This work is intended
to provide a body of historical evidence of the participation of the UPC in the Third World
Internationalist Movement.
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I. Introduction:
One hot morning in November, I found myself shoulder to shoulder with the blue-andorange uniformed students of class 5A at the Mario Academic Complex in Yaoundé. The
lesson was Cameroonian History, and I sat on a bench at the back of the class with my head
resting against the cool cement wall. The lecturer detailed Cameroon’s colonial history, and
arriving at the mid-twentieth century, he paused and, turning from the chalkboard, asked the
class, “Who can give me the definition of nationalism?” The room was silent for a moment
until the boy seated next to me stood and said, “Nationalism is an extreme love for one’s
country, a want to support and preserve one’s country, patriotism.” There was silence again,
and then a girl rose quietly from her seat in the far corner of the room. “Nationalism,” she
said, “is the desire for freedom and liberation.” The two students had, knowingly or
unknowingly, presented vastly different perspectives on nationalism; the first posited the state
as the natural expression of a nation, and therefore something that precedes nationalism. The
second, while perhaps still recognizing the state as an essential element, views nationalism as
the struggle not to preserve the integrity of the nation-state, but rather to establish a
representative state for a nation. Both perspectives are, of course, valid, but they are indicative
of different historical circumstances.
Historically speaking, early African nationalism was much more in line with the
ideology of liberation. The nationalisms of great post-World War II leaders like Kwame
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor and others, were simply various
articulations of the reclamation of an African identity; each was a demand for and affirmation
of the humanity and dignity of African people denied by centuries of slavery and
imperialism. 1

In this sense proto-nationalism was anti-imperialism, the struggle for the

formation of nation-states and a reaction against foreign domination, and should therefore not
1

Issa G. Shivji, “The Rise, the Fall, and the Insurrection of Nationalism in Africa.” Paper from the Keynote
Address to the CODESRIA East African Regional Conference. Addis Ababa: October 29-31, 2003, p. 5.
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be confused with the European nationalist formula of the early eighteenth century. Unity was
central to the nationalist doctrine, and international solidarity was viewed as a vital part of the
struggle for independence and equality. Julius Nyerere, the former president of Tanzania,
expressed this vitality in 1963, when he said “African nationalism is meaningless, is
anachronistic, and is dangerous if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism.” 2
This thrust toward unity and anti-colonialism was not limited to Africa alone.
Nationalist movements were also developing and succeeding in Asia in the mid-twentieth
century, in such places as India, Vietnam (then Indochina), China and Indonesia. Newly
independent nations on both continents were emerging into an international context that was
polarized by the Cold War, and both blocs were eager to extend their influence to the rest of
the world, the West by continued colonial and neo-colonial domination, and the Soviet bloc
by strategic support of anti-colonial movements. It was under these circumstances that the
idea of solidarity among independent Afro-Asian states, or Third World Internationalism as it
would later come to be called, developed as a method for supporting ongoing liberation
movements and protecting emergent states.
The history of Cameroon’s nationalist movement and independence is, in some ways,
representative of the larger history of African nationalism. The Union des Populations du
Cameroun (UPC), Cameroon’s first indigenous political party and the territory’s foremost
nationalist movement until its interdiction in French Cameroon in 1955, struggled to remove
Cameroon immediately and entirely from colonial control by organizing and educating the
population internally, and by working at the international level to push the French
Administration to accelerate the independence process. However, Cameroon’s independence
was also a somewhat unique case in the African context. According to Frédéric Augustine
2

Julius Nyerere. Speeches and Writings cited in Issa G. Shivji, “The Rise, the Fall, and the Insurrection of
Nationalism in Africa.” Paper from the Keynote Address to the CODESRIA East African Regional
Conference. Addis Ababa: October 29-31, 2003.
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Kodock, the UPC’s current Secretary General, “In terms of the struggle for national
liberation, Cameroon is the only country where the nationalist leaders were eliminated and the
nationalists ground down in such a way that DeGaulle could choose whoever he liked [to lead
the country].” Indeed, the French administration did everything in its power to prevent the
UPC from achieving its stated goals in Cameroon, ultimately resulting in severe repression
and the banning of the party in the mid-1950s.
As a result of this particularity of Cameroon’s nationalist movement, any study of the
UPC’s international actions, especially from 1955 onward, is necessarily a study of Third
World Internationalism. Rather than eliminating the nationalist threat, the intensified effort to
suppress the UPC on the part of the French pushed the party to rely heavily on support from
the exterior, particularly within the framework of Afro-Asian cooperation. The UPC
continued its activities, with much of the leadership in exile, publicizing their cause and
soliciting political and material support for the party militants that would remain clandestinely
in the country and conduct a protracted guerrilla conflict that lasted well beyond Cameroon’s
negotiated independence.
Much of the previous research conducted on the history of the Union des Populations
du Cameroun has focused on the party’s activities at the national level, specifically during the
period of the maquis conflict. The aim of this study, therefore, will be to provide a basic
history of the UPC’s participation in the Third World Internationalist project, with specific
focus on the concrete manifestations of solidarity that were the linchpin in the UPC’s
activities both sous maquis 3 as well as abroad. The paper will begin with a brief synopsis of
methodology, as well as some of limitations and challenges of studying the internationalism
of the UPC. The following section will provide more detailed background information on
Third World Internationalism, Cameroon’s history, and the UPC. Finally, the findings on the
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UPC’s engagement of Afro-Asian solidarity will be presented in two thematic sections; the
first will examine the development of the UPC’s diplomatic and political relationships with
the Third World, and the second will focus on more tangible aspects of cooperation that these
relationships produced, particularly with concern to educational and military aid.

II. Methodology
The subject of this study grew out of a curiosity about a particular document in
Yaoundé’s national archives. The document is a notice to the French authorities in Yaoundé
dated May 12th, 1959, that details the expulsion of Felix Roland Moumie, then the president
of the UPC, from Egypt. 4 Moumié had been living in Cairo for two years in 1959, and
Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was one of the primary architects of the Afro-Asian
movement, and was well-known for his support of progressive nationalist movements. What
could have caused this rupture between the UPC, and the country which had been so generous
to it and so sympathetic to its cause? Was Moumié’s expulsion from Cairo a premonition of
the demise of Third World Internationalism, which many scholars argue was doomed from its
inception, and was largely defunct by the 1970s? With these questions raised, the UPC’s
international efforts were suddenly transported to the center of the history of Third World
Internationalism, and the disintegration of the Third World Project was reflected in the story
of the UPC’s ultimate failure to affect the changes it believed necessary for Cameroon’s
development.
Connecting these two stories seemed relevant for a number of reasons: First, to
contribute to the discourse on the significance and viability of the Third World project and to
further illuminate the history of the UPC. There is also a certain urgency, I feel, to the study

3

Literally translated from French, sous maquis means “under brush,” and is a term used to refer to the UPC’s
clandestine activity in Cameroon, particularly clandestine military activity.
4
ACNY-1AC439. “Expulsion de MOUMIE du Caire.” This document is reproduced as an appendix at the end
of the paper.
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of the shortcomings of both Third World Internationalism and the UPC. The recent
confluence of the peak of American directed globalization and global financial crisis creates
significant opportunities for resistance to “bad” capitalist globalization, which will necessitate
an engagement of and interplay between the global and the local similar to what was
employed, or at least attempted, by Third World Internationalists. This project is intended to
be the first step in such a study.
Studying the UPC’s interactions with Third World Internationalism proved to be a
challenge. Much of the information on the subject is to be found in outside of Cameroon− in
the archives of the colonial administration in France, and in the various countries that
cooperated with the UPC. Furthermore, many of the people who were involved with the party
before 1970 are no longer living or are living outside of the country, and those who are still in
Cameroon are spread over various parts of the country. Finally, the history of the UPC is
immense and complicated, and difficult to grasp in the space of just a few weeks.
My methodology was largely an attempt to work around these challenges, and
involved sifting through history books, archived documents, and theses, and meeting with
researchers at the University of Yaoundé I who conduct their research on the UPC. 5 This was
helpful in collecting background information, and for building a general knowledge of the
party’s history. Occasionally, a meeting or my secondary research would produce a reference
to the international cooperation of the party, in the form of an invitation for a UPC leader to
travel to a particular country, or the mention of military or economic aid. I would then search
for biographical information about the people involved in the event, and incorporate any
applicable information into detailed questionnaires, which I designed individually for each of
my four interviewees. Given the relatively small number of informants, and the importance of
their knowledge to the project, I conducted long, in-depth interviews with each informant.

9

Occasionally, opinions would diverge on the specific details of UPC history.
Incidentally, Moumié’s expulsion from Cairo is also a prime example of some of the
frustrations I encountered of this nature. Marthe Moumié, who moved with her husband as he
toured the progressive Third World nations, and lived in Cairo until 1959, denies that her
husband was exiled from Egypt, and attributes their subsequent move to Conakry to the
ascension of a sympathetic government which was closer to Cameroon, and therefore a better
fit for the nationalist aims of the UPC. However, Théophil Nono stated that a significant part
of the UPC office in Cairo was expelled, while Frédéric Augustine Kodock asserted that it
was only Moumié who was asked to leave the country. As, especially given the constraints of
time, it is impossible to gauge the accuracy of any of these arguments relative to the others, I
have tried to indicate those facts which have been similarly contested in my work.

III. Background:
Creating the Third World: Pan- Africanism and Afro-Asian Cooperation
At the turn of the 20th century, the American writer and intellectual W.E.B. Dubois
gave the closing remarks at the Pan-African Conference at Westminster Hall in London, in a
speech entitled “To the Nations of the World.” In this speech, Dubois extended the American
color line 6 to the world, arguing for the existence of a similar line that separated the “Darker
Nations” 7 from their European and American counterparts, stating,
The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, the
question as to how far differences of race…are going to be made, hereafter, the
basis of denying to over half of the world the right of sharing to their utmost
ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization. 8
5

I have included these meetings as informal or semi-formal interviews in my references, but have not cited
information I received in these meetings in the body of the paper unless it was confirmed by a primary
informant.
6
The American color line is a theoretical divide based on race that separates those with privilege in American
society versus those without. See: W.E.B. Dubois. The Souls of Black Folk. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.,
1903.
7
Dubois, W.E.B. “To the Nations of the World.” The Oxford W.E.B. Dubois Reader, Eric J. Sunquist, ed. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996. p.625.
8
Ibid.
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United by a common experience of racial humiliation, cultural domination, political
domination, and economic exploitation under European and American slavery and
imperialism, 9 Dubois and other Pan-Africanists felt that Africans– both on the continent and
in the Diaspora– shared a common psychology and philosophy, which should form the basis
for political and cultural solidarity aimed at teaching the Western world its ills and securing
freedom and equality for the people who found themselves on the wrong side of the color
line.
The ideology of Pan-Africanism was largely transmitted through Dubois and other
“New World” intellectuals, in conjunction with a number of African thinkers, most notably
Dr. Wilmot Blyden and Bishop James Johnson. Between 1900 and 1945, six Pan-African
conferences were held, uniting leaders and intellectuals of African origin from Africa, the
United States, and the Caribbean. 10 The influence from the United States and the Caribbean,
and the nature of British colonial administration, which was more indirect and allowed for
slightly more political expression in its African colonies than French, Belgian or Portuguese
administrations did, meant that English was the language of expression for the PanAfricanists. 11 Consequently, it was primarily rising political leaders in British Colonies who
would embrace the idea of Pan-Africanism, and become prominent in the movement. By the
mid 1950s, a number of African territories were succeeding in gaining independence from
colonial domination. The independence of these countries marked an important change in
Pan-Africanism; the movement, which had originated as a movement of intellectuals and
thinkers, would take on increasingly political overtones. 12 By the time Ghana, the first subSaharan colony to break with its European colonial administration, achieved independence in

9

Shivji, p. 4.
S.A. Akintoye. Emergent African States : Topics in Twentieth Century African History. London: Longman
Group, 1976, pp. 98-100.
11
V.G. Fanso, private interview, 11-22-2008, Yaoundé.
12
Akintoye, p. 121.
10
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1957, Pan-Africanism was, while still retaining the ideology of global African unity, a
movement of independent states cooperating to fight colonialism and create unity on the
continent.
Many Pan-African thinkers saw Pan-Africanism and Pan-Asianism, which was
developing along a similar trajectory to Pan-Africanism throughout the twentieth century, as
mutual global struggles. Despite racial and cultural differences that excluded them from a
Pan-African identity, Asia and the Middle East had also suffered centuries under colonial and
imperial domination, were largely subject to the same conditions, and therefore had a claim in
the international solidarity necessitated by the color line. 13 It was not until the movements
took on a more directly political, state-centered, aspect that the two movements coincided to
form the Afro-Asian bloc. Culminating in the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Afro-Asian
bloc ultimately consolidated itself around the same common oppression that Pan-Africanism
used to unite the experiences of Africans in different parts of the world. In an attempt to deemphasize the vast differences between the particular problems of individual nations, Third
World Internationalism mobilized an identity based on a fundamental opposition of two
groups defined in dialectical terms, with powerful “civilized” nations on one side, and AfroAsian polities on the other. This binary was reproduced on a number of different levels, in
terms of race (White versus Non-White), imperialism (colonizer versus colonized), economics
(developed versus underdeveloped) and international political power (those with power versus
those without). 14

In varying combinations, these dialectic relationships were the

underpinnings of the Third World as both a concept and a movement.
Malik Bennabi, an early theoretician of the Afro-Asian movement, notes however, that
the mere existence of common oppression throughout the post-colonial world does not

13

Bill V. Mullen, “Dubois: Dark Princess and the Afro-Asian International.” Positions, vol. 11:1. Spring 2003,
p. 218.
14
Boutros Boutros Ghali and Simone Dreyfus. Le Mouvement Afro-Asiatique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1969, p. 20.
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necessarily predicate the concept of the Third World, as such. 15

The combinations of

opposing identities that characterized global power dynamics simply reflected a political
reality, and did not correspond to a transnational consciousness on the part of Afro-Asian
populations. In this way, the project of Third World internationalism can be understood as an
effort to create both an Afro-Asian consciousness (in other words, to create the Third World
as an international unit) and subsequently, a politics of international solidarity within the
Third World aimed at equalizing the international power of nations. Such a transnational
consciousness was, however, difficult and slow in coming. Pan Africanism and Pan Asianism
were separated geographically by the Sahara and the Indian Ocean, psychologically by the
memory of the Atlantic slave trade, as well as by very real racial tensions, that divided Black
Africans from “White” North Africans and Asians. Consequently, the unifying ideological
justification for the Afro-Asian movement would necessarily have to be a common
perspective on their political futures. 16
The Bandung Conference is generally understood to be the first concrete iteration of
Third World ideology. The conference, held from April 18-24, 1955 in Bandung Indonesia,
gathered the leadership of twenty-nine independent African and Asian states and eight
observers, among them a number of African states that were not yet fully autonomous. The
goal of the conference was to promote Afro-Asian cooperation in economic, cultural and
political matters, and to oppose colonialism and imperialism “in all its forms,” arguably an
implicit reference to both the more traditional forms of colonialism proffered by the West, and
Soviet intervention in the colonial and post-colonial world. Despite the organizers’ statement
preceding the conference that it sought neither to create a “Third Bloc” nor lay the
groundwork for an Afro-Asiatic organization, the ten-point communiqué that resulted from
the conference would go on to become the guiding principles of Third World
15
16

Ibid.
Ibid., p.24.

13

internationalism. The resolution was passed unanimously, and adhered of all of the
participants to its stipulations, which included: respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all nations, respect for fundamental human rights, racial and national equality,
abstention from the interference in the internal affairs of other states and abstention from
exerting pressure on other states, mutual cooperation, and respect for justice and international
obligations, among others.

17

The “Spirit of Bandung,” or a politics based on the Ten Points,

would go on to be the foundation of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Nonaligned Movement, and the various other Afro-Asian conferences that followed Bandung.

Colonial History and the Founding of the UPC
In 1916, in the final stages of World War I, the Anglo-French forces of central Africa
succeeded in ousting the German administration from Kamerun, which had been a colony
under German control since 1884. After a short-lived attempt at administrative condominium,
or joint military administration, German Kamerun was partitioned along the Picot line, which
separated the territory into two parts, running from north to south. The western part of former
German Kamerun was occupied by the British and administered as part of Nigeria, and the
French were given control of the eastern part of the territory. The occupation of German
Kamerun ended formally in 1922, when the League of Nations evaluated the territory. 18 The
League of Nations evaluation resulted in the classification of French and British Cameroon as
Mandated territories, whose administration was trusted to France and Britain, respectively.
The mandate system was designed to move colonial territories toward independence, based on
a system of socio-cultural and economic classification. In theory, a territory could make
improvements in both of these areas in order to move closer to autonomy and independence,
but in practice, the mandate was little more than a more palatable legal name for direct
17
18

Boutros Ghali and Dreyfus, p. 60.
Victor Julius Ngoh, History of Cameroon since 1800. Limbe: Presbook, 1996, p. 60.
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colonial administration.

19

After the dissolution of the League of Nations during World War

Two, the two Cameroons would become United Nations (UN) trust territories. The trust
system was almost identical to the League of Nations mandate, and the territories were once
again entrusted to British and French colonial powers by the UN in 1946, with the expectation
that they would be prepared for autonomy and independence. 20
Throughout this process, a significant nationalist tendency was emerging among
French Cameroon’s educated elite, who had been exposed to the ideas of liberty, equality and
self determination, and who were aware of France’s legal obligations to Cameroon as a trust.
On April 10th, 1948, a group of twelve professionals, syndicalists and intellectuals led by
Julius Ngom met at a café in Douala. Around a table at “Chez Sierra,” the twelve men would
draft the statutes of Cameroon’s first indigenous political party, effectively creating the Union
des Populations du Cameroon. 21 According to the constitution they drafted at this first
meeting in Douala and submitted to the French authorities for approval and legalization, the
goal of the party was to “unite all the populations of Cameroon with the aim of raising their
standard of living.” 22 Once the party had been legalized, a new set of statutes for the party
was released. Under these new statutes the party based its platform on three principal
demands: immediate independence, immediate reunification, and no foreign interventions into
Cameroonian domestic affairs. 23

19

Dieudonné Pouhe, “Les Liasons Exterieures de l’Union des Populations du Cameroun: 1948-1963.” Master’s
thesis. Yaoundé: University of Yaoundé I, Apr. 1999, p. 1.
20
Bakang ba Tonjé, Indépendance Réelle D’abord. Douala : Editions Kunde, 2007, p. 32.
21
Tonje, p. 40.
22
Bakang ba Tonjé, Indépendance Réelle D’abord. Douala : Editions Kunde, 2007, p. 36.
23
Kodock, 11-27 -2008.
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Early Internationalism and the Interdiction of the UPC in French Cameroon
Cameroon’s legal status as an international trust, and the ideology of solidarity
propounded by movements such as Pan-Africanism and Negritude undoubtedly contributed to
the international vision present in the party from its founding in 1948. Ruben Um Nyobe, the
first secretary general of the UPC, describes the significance of the UPC in Cameroon as
follows:
Before the creation of the UPC, the world was closed for Cameroon, just as
it remained ignored by the world…from a political point of view, only the
voices of the administration and the elected officials in favor of colonialism
were able to make themselves heard domestically and internationally. 24
The party’s mission was, therefore, twofold. Not only would it organize and educate
Cameroonians about their rights, but it would also serve as a mouthpiece, exposing the wrongs
of French colonialism in Cameroon, and imperialism in a more general sense, to the exterior.
Much of the UPC’s early international interactions were driven by this responsibility, and the
leadership of the party was extremely vocal in denouncing French repression in Indochina
(now Vietnam), and American armament and intervention in West Germany. 25
Almost immediately after its founding, the UPC joined the Rassemblement Democratique
Africain (RDA), then headed by Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The RDA was an organization that
grouped the representatives from the local assemblies of each of the associated French
territories in West and Central Africa in order to put pressure on the French government to
accelerate the independence process for its African colonies. 26 When the RDA was created in
1946, the French national government was a coalition government, and the French Communist
Party (PCF), which opposed colonialism, had several seats in the national assembly. This
created an opportunity for the African representatives of the RDA to form an alliance with the
24

Achille Mbembe, Ruben Um Nyobe :Ecrits Sous Maquis. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989, p. 57. Translated from
French.
25
Marthe Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, private interview, 11-19-2008, Ebolowa.
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PCF, in order to increase its influence on French colonial policy. Despite the fact that the UPC
had no representatives in the Cameroonian local assembly, the party became the Cameroonian
branch of the RDA, where the UPC first initiated its relationship with the French
Communists. 27 The UPC was heavily involved in the leadership of the organization, with Um
Nyobe serving as the RDA’s vice president until 1955. 28
The international aspect of the UPC’s struggle for independence also brought its
leadership before the United Nations a number of times in the early 1950s. In 1952, Ruben Um
Nyobe was selected as part of a Cameroonian delegation that would appear before the UN
Trust Council, to argue the case of the Union des Populations du Cameroun before the
assembly. He returned again in both 1953 and 1955 to accuse France of failing to fulfill its
obligations to Cameroon, stipulated by article 76b of the United Nations trust statutes, which
stated that France should be preparing its trusts to move “rapidly” toward independence.29
As the party’s leadership was publicizing the question of Cameroon’s independence at
the international level, the UPC was also enjoying a growing popularity in Cameroon itself. A
series of campaigns in the various regions of the country, and increasing dissatisfaction with
French policy saw UPC membership burgeon in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Alarmed by
the immense popular appeal of the UPC’s radical message, the French administration, led by
André Soucadeaux and later by Roland Pré who replaced Socadeaux as Cameroon’s high
commissioner, began to take steps to prevent the UPC from gaining power and influence in the
colony. 30 The French administration organized alternate delegations to the United Nations to
negate the testimony of Um Nyobe, and contest his ability to speak for all Cameroonians, and a

26

Fanso, 11-22-2008. After the Brazzaville Conference convened by the French in 1944, local electoral
assemblies were created in the French African Colonies, whose representatives could then participate as
observers in the French national assembly.
27
Fanso, 11-22-2008.
28
Fanso, 11-22-2008 ; Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.
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Richard Joseph, Le Mouvement Nationaliste au Cameroun. Paris : Editions Karthala, 2000, p. 213 ; Kodock,
11-27-2008 ; Pouhe, p. 24
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Fanso, 11-22-2008.
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series of electoral frauds kept the party from gaining seats in the local assembly, even in
regions where they were extremely popular. 31
As early as 1952, it was clear to the UPC that the French were not going to allow them to
impose their agenda on Cameroon through the normal political channels. 32 The UPC’s strategy
at the national level became increasingly militant throughout the early 1950’s, relying more
and more on civil unrest, strikes and boycotts to make its message heard. The party was also
facing difficulties in the RDA. In 1950, the PCF had been ousted from their seats in French
national assembly and the governmental opposition coalition that the RDA had relied on
previously dissolved. Houphouët-Boigny decided to steer the Rassemblement toward a more
moderate politics of cooperation. Dissatisfied with this choice and without any possibility of
cooperating with an administration that clearly wanted to see the UPC eliminated from
Cameroonian politics, the UPC and the RDA became increasingly estranged from one another.
In 1955, Um Nyobe was removed from his position as vice president, and the UPC was
officially asked to leave the organization. 33
As the twenty-nine nations in attendance at the Bandung conference were drafting their
statement of solidarity and support for anti-colonial movements, the UPC and a number of
related syndicates and youth organizations were signing a document reaffirming their
commitment to the UPC’s platform of immediate independence and reunification in response
to the violent French repression of a series of strikes staged in Douala from January to April,
1955. 34 These strikes precipitated the occupation of Bassaland 35 in southern Cameroon by
French forces coming from Dakar and French Equatorial Africa, and violent conflicts in this
area, particularly in Douala and Yaoundé, and resulting hundreds of deaths in May of the same

31

Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.
Frédéric Kodock, private interview, 11-24-2008.
33
Fanso, 11-22-2008.
34
Tonje, pp. 76-77.
35
Bassaland can be roughly approximated as the region between Douala and Yaoundé.
32

18

year. 36 Seen as one of the primary instigators of the unrest, the UPC was officially outlawed in
French Cameroon on July 13th, 1955. This decision would send much of the party underground
to begin the Maquis conflict under the leadership of Ruben Um Nyobe, and a significant
portion of the UPC’s leadership, including the party’s president Félix-Roland Moumié, Ernest
Ouandié and Abel Kingue, joint vice presidents of the party, and ten others into exile in British
Southern Cameroon.

IV. Political and Diplomatic Cooperation
Afro-Asian Cooperation: 1955-1960
The party’s banning in 1955 marked a significant change in the UPC’s engagement of
Third World internationalism. Prior to the UPC’s expulsion from French Cameroon, the
leadership focused their internationalist efforts on gaining legitimacy, and influencing the
French government via the UN, the RDA, and a handful of other smaller organizations. Once
the party was outlawed, the UPC had to rely much more on an increasingly organized Third
World network for political aid, as well as support for the armed struggle being waged inside
Cameroon. 37 The footings for this transition were already in place for the UPC; the brutal
French repression of the strikes in Douala in the spring of 1955 solicited letters of support to
the leadership of the UPC from both Kwame Nkrumah, the prime minister of Gold Coast (now
Ghana), and Abdel Gamal Nasser, the president of Egypt. Both letters expressed condolences
for the families who were affected by the violence, and condemned the French reaction to the
strikes. Nasser also noted in his letter that Egypt sent a petition to the United Nations in favor
of the UPC. The events of Douala in May also caused the Indian delegation to the UN to
intervene vehemently on behalf of the UPC, protesting French colonial policy. 38
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The UPC members who had been exiled from French Cameroon set up offices in Kumba,
British Cameroon, where they continued their activities. Quickly however, the French
administration convinced British Cameroon that the UPC was also a threat to the stability of
their territory, and the thirteen members of the Kumba office were forced to seek political
asylum outside of Cameroon in 1957. 39 The group contacted India, Ghana, the Sudan, and
Egypt to request admission into the country, and as Khartoum was the first to respond
positively, the group took up residence in the Sudan for a period of approximately six months.
There, they were welcomed by the Sudanese government, which provided for their housing and
expenses, including the continued publication of the UPC’s journal La Voix du Cameroun, and
offered political counsel to the party, sharing the newly independent state’s efforts to become
self-sufficient. 40 Nkrumah, now the president of an independent Ghana, renewed his ties with
the UPC, making a diplomatic visit to Khartoum to reiterate his support for the party. 41
In 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, effectively defeating the
French and English interests that dominated the important trade route. This event secured his
position as a champion of both Afro-Asian cooperation and anti-imperialism. In the same year,
the headquarters of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity were moved to Cairo, now a
veritable Mecca for both African nationalists and Third World internationalists. Martha
Moumié, the wife of Félix Roland Moumié and one of the exiled members of the UPC,
explained the attraction of Nasser’s Egypt to a struggling nationalist movement, “When we
saw that Nasser could nationalize the Suez Canal, could resist the French and the British and
win, we said to ourselves, this is someone who can really help [the UPC].” 42
The Egyptian government accepted Moumié’s request, and the group moved its base of
operations to Cairo. The Upécistes were given a villa in the Zamalek quarter of Cairo that had
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been abandoned by an English businessman after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and
each of the thirteen asylees received a pension from the Egyptian government. Cairo proved to
be the staging ground for the UPC’s international relations. Through the Afro-Asian
movement, the UPC was put into contact with nearly all of the Third World. This network
allowed the party to project its message well beyond the African continent and build
diplomatic relationships with independent states that could offer political, economic or military
aid to help it achieve its national goals. 43 Within this context, the leadership of the UPC was
also able to interact with anti-colonial activists from all over the world. In this sense,
international solidarity was not only expressed in diplomatic or material aid, but also in a close
network of personal relationships between Third World leaders. Such was the case with Abel
Kingue and Ernest Ouandié, who built a close friendship with Nelson Mandela, and with Félix
Roland Moumié, who befriended Frantz Fanon, the famous anti-colonial intellectual who was,
like Moumié, a psychiatrist by trade. 44
The UPC was quickly incorporated into the Afro-Asian secretariat, and set up an
official office at the organization’s headquarters, which contained the individual offices of
nationalist movements from all over Africa, including South Africa’s African National
Congress (ANC) and the Front National de Liberation (FLN) of Algeria. Each movement
carried out its own individual activities, and also cooperated by sharing ideas and strategies in
joint meetings. Nasser was able to negotiate a place for the UPC in various Afro-Asian
conferences, even securing observer status for Moumié and a delegate of Algeria’s FLN to a
meeting of African heads of state in Accra in 1958. 45 The UPC offices at the Secretariat
focused primarily on publicizing the situation in Cameroon, continuing to publish La Voix du
Cameroun, and holding “sensitization” meetings in various neighborhoods around Cairo, at
which they educated the Egyptian population about their particular struggle and about the
43
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importance of the Egyptian government’s commitment to Third World Solidarity. Nasser also
accorded the party a slot on Egypt’s national radio, Radio le Caire, which the party used to
broadcast political propaganda and dispatches on events in Cameroon, and denounce French
policy in Cameroon and abroad. 46
As part of his duties as President of the party, Moumié traveled extensively throughout
his time in exile, sometimes to attend Afro-Asian conferences, sometimes at the invitation of
foreign leaders, and still others in an attempt to multiply the UPC’s diplomatic liaisons.
Consequently, many of the close international relationships that the UPC would come to
depend on owe their existence, at least in part, to him. The UPC’s relationship with the
People’s Republic of China, one of the party’s greatest advocates, is just one example. In 1958,
Moumié made the first visit by a UPC leader to China at the invitation of the Chinese
Committee on Afro-Asian Solidarity, where he was received by the prime minister, Chou en
Lai. China, led by Chou, had been one of the major actors at the Bandung Conference and
readily supported the UPC, providing funding, military training, and diplomatic support to the
movement. The UPC’s relationship with China continued to be strong, as Moumié made
several trips there between 1958 and 1960, followed by a number of other UPC delegations. 47
It was at China’s invitation that a delegation from Union Democratique des Femmes
Camerounaises (UDEFEC), a UPC women’s organization, made a trip to China, Indonesia and
Vietnam, which had been led to independence from French domination several years earlier by
Ho Chi Minh. The three-woman delegation, which consisted of Marguerite Ngoyi, Monique
Kamen, and Marthe Moumié, met with women’s organizations in all three countries, in order
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to exchange strategy and techniques. The trip culminated in a séance with Ho himself, in which
he congratulated the women on their work, and pledged his continued support to the UPC. 48
In Africa, Moumié moved regularly between Guinea, newly liberated under Sekou Touré,
Ghana, and the seat of the FLN in Algiers. Each of these places, as well as Morocco, Tunisia,
Mali, China and the Soviet Union were accorded permanent representatives of the UPC, with
the aim of further strengthening relations with the host country. In 1959, after his alleged
expulsion from Cairo, 49 Moumié moved his permanent offices to Conakry, Guinea, where he
was incorporated into Touré’s government as an advisor. In 1959, Moumié was sponsored as
part of a Guinean delegation to the United Nations, led by Ismail Touré, the president’s
brother, in order to protest ongoing French intervention in the politics of Cameroon, now a
nominally autonomous trust territory. Guinea was also an important strategic point of entry and
exit from Cameroon. Like many other sympathetic governments, Guinea would provide fake
passports to facilitate the travel of UPC leaders, and young combatants and students leaving
Cameroon clandestinely for training abroad. 50
Ghana, like Guinea, was also an important center of support for the UPC. After winning
the Presidency of Ghana, Nkrumah took an even more radical position than Nasser or Touré,
acting as one of the leading proponents of Pan-Africanism (Nkrumah would found the
Organization for African Unity in 1963, which is still in existence today as the African Union)
and taking a much more militant stance toward anti-colonialism. He created the African Affairs
Center, in the Airport district of Accra, which grouped together various nationalist movements
from sub-Saharan Africa. 51 The first All-Africa People’s Conference, which was hosted by
Nkrumah, gave a part of the UPC leadership, namely vice president Ernest Ouandié and his
48

Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.

49

There is significant disagreement about the truth of these allegations, as discussed earlier in the paper. It is,
however, certain that the UPC maintained a connection with Egypt, as Osende Afana, who had come from
France earlier in the year to join Moumie in Egypt, would continue to represent the UPC in the Afro-Asian
secretariat in Cairo until 1964.

23

wife, Marthe, who was the leader of UDEFEC, and Sakeo Kamen, a member of the party’s
executive committee, to install themselves in Ghana and set up offices in Accra. In Ghana, as
in Egypt, the UPC was given airspace on the national radio frequency, which was used to
broadcast dispatches from the party’s leadership and educate the population about the specter
of neo-colonialism. Ghana’s proximity to Cameroon and President Nkrumah’s enthusiastic
support of the party soon made Accra a center not only for UPC members in exile or in transit
to other African or Asian countries, but also for Cameroonian expatriates of all kinds.52
According to Marthe Moumié, it was on a trip to Accra that Félix Roland Moumié made
the acquaintance of Patrice Lumumba, the prime minister of Congo-Leopoldville, who was
famously one of only sixteen university graduates at the time of his country’s independence.
The two ended up becoming close friends, and in 1960 Moumié traveled to Congo at the
invitation of Lumumba in order to lend the young, progressive leader support in reconstructing
the Congo and help to organize Congolese youth. 53 Moumié’s stay was cut short by a threat
from CIA-supported Mobutu Sese Sekou, then Congo’s army chief of staff, published in the
Congolese newspaper, L’Essor Du Congo shortly after his arrival in the country: “If I lay
hands on him, I will make him a present to the Prime Minister of Cameroon, I will send it to
him by special [government] airplane.” 54
Having been chased from the Congo, Moumié traveled to Switzerland, where the UPC
would occasionally purchase weapons to send back to the Maquis. 55 However, there is
speculation that this particular trip was made to Geneva as part of a mission that Moumié was
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carrying out for Lumumba. 56 On November 2, 1960, Félix Roland Moumié accepted a dinner
interview at a lakefront restaurant in Geneva with a “journalist” named William Bechtel, who
was actually an agent for the French special services, or the “Main Rouge.” Moumié was called
away from the table for a phone call, and imprudently left his glass with Bechtel. After two
weeks in a coma in the Cantonal Hospital, the UPC’s president succumbed to a double dose of
thallium that Bechtel administered to him by way of his forgotten drink. 57

The Revolutionary Committee, Ahidjo’s Republic, and the Diplomatic Struggle for the Third
World
Moumié’s death left a void in the party’s leadership, both internationally and in the
interior of Cameroon. Ruben Um Nyobe’s capture and assassination in the maquis some two
years earlier in 1958 had caused a rupture in communication between the leadership in exile
and their counterparts waging a guerrilla war against the French forces in Cameroon, causing
the latter to plunge into disorder, dissolving into an amalgamation of various autonomous
militias. 58 Moumié’s assassination only exasperated this situation, as the portion of the party in
the exterior also divided itself into factions that, to the detriment of the party’s success, were
never able to fully reconcile themselves with one another. 59
In early 1961, only a few months after Moumié’s death, Lumumba was also assassinated
by Belgian forces with the complicity of his rivals in the Congo and much of the West, which
was fearful of the emergence of another “pro-communist” state in Central Africa. Incidentally,
Lumumba’s assassination would bring an influx of new leadership into the UPC, as a number
of Cameroonian students, who happened to be active members of the UPC branch in Paris,
were expelled from France on charges of anti-French subversion after protesting the
56
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assassination. 60 This action brought both Nguo Woungly Massaga and Michel Ndoh to Accra,
where they were installed as permanent representatives of the UPC, and would later be
incorporated into the Comité Revolutionnaire created by Ernest Ouandié to direct the UPC
after Moumié’s death. 61 After the creation of the Comité Revolutionnaire, Ouandié returned
secretly to Cameroon to reorganize and revitalize the maquis, and Woungly Massaga, charged
with the UPC’s relations to the exterior, became the primary actor in the international
cooperation of the party. 62
In addition to the effective decapitation of the party, after the assassinations of both Um
Nyobe and Moumié and Ouandié’s return to Cameroon, the position of the UPC internationally
was also jeopardized by political developments in Cameroon itself. After the UPC was banned
in French Cameroon in 1955, more moderate forces in Cameroonian politics took the matter of
independence into their own hands, negotiating a cooperative independence for the territory. In
1956, the French instituted the loi-cadre, which dissolved the existing territorial assembly and
called for elections. 63 None of the four parties that gained seats in the legislative assembly
were able to win a majority, and so the French administration hand-picked the pro-French
André-Marie Mbida to form a government as prime minister.

64

In 1958, Mbida was ousted by

a vote of no confidence in the parliament, and Ahmadou Ahidjo replaced him as prime
minister, again with the consent of the French government. On January 1st, 1960, Ahidjo
declared French Cameroon an independent republic, of which he became president.
As Third World internationalism was principally a movement of states, the UPC’s
relationship with the movement would complicate itself after Cameroon’s independence under
Ahidjo. Throughout much of the 1950s, the party enjoyed the support of “mainstream” Third
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World internationalism, being supported at the UN by various countries and enjoying material
support from a similarly diverse group. However, Cameroon’s independence in 1960 caused a
conflict among the UPC’s international supporters. They were forced to choose between
recognizing Ahidjo and initiating diplomatic relationships with the Cameroonian republic, or
remaining steadfast in their support of the UPC, which claimed that the country’s
independence had “nothing to do with the objectives pursued by the UPC from its creation.” 65
The choice was made little by little as nations, even those who had been great supporters
of the UPC, essentially disavowed the party and recognized Ahidjo. Quickly realizing that the
elimination of the nationalist threat would require an attack on the UPC’s sources of
international support, Ahidjo launched a two-pronged campaign against the party, attempting
to eradicate the party in the interior militarily, and strategically positioning his regime in the
international community. Ahidjo’s diplomatic team attempted to create individual relationships
with progressive states that were sympathetic to the UPC’s cause by approaching them with
offers of political and economic cooperation, and distributing anti-UPC propaganda. The newly
founded OAU also proved central to Ahidjo’s diplomatic war against the UPC. The
organization was a major source of cooperation between more moderate and radical African
states, and from its founding, Ahidjo involved Cameroon heavily in the OAU’s cooperative
efforts in an attempt to increase the legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of his peers. 66
The choice to support the Cameroonian Republic was made for a number of reasons;
some countries had other political motives they wished to serve, as was the case with Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt, and a number of other states, who hoped to include Ahidjo, a Muslim from the
north of Cameroon, in a coalition against Israel. Egypt nevertheless retained some ties with the
UPC, allowing Osende Afana to remain at his post representing the UPC at the Afro-Asian
secretariat in Cairo until 1964, when he was expelled from the country for creating the Afro65
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Latino American Movement, which the Egyptian government said purposely excluded North
Africa. 67 Although still cooperating with the UPC, Ghana and Guinea recognized Cameroon
in 1962. In 1963, UPC leaders in Guinea, namely Abel Kingue and Ndeh Ntumazah were
arrested and imprisoned for carrying out subversive activities against the government of Sekou
Touré. 68
Ultimately, for many leaders, the choice to both recognize and support Ahidjo as the
head of Cameroon’s independent state would be based on the question of precedent. As Third
World internationalists were supporting liberation movements and trying to create Afro-Asian
solidarity in the international arena, they were simultaneously trying to consolidate their power
and stabilize their states at home. Supporting a movement like the UPC, which was not
directing its efforts not against the French colonial administration, but against an independent
state, could endanger these efforts. Increasingly, the party was forced to rely on a small number
of states that were willing to support anti-neo-colonial movements, and was therefore
radicalized relative to the dominant strain of Third World internationalism.

V. Solidarity in Practice
Educational Aid: Le System Boursier
Even before 1960, the organization of the UPC in the exterior was loose, at best.
Consequently, the UPC’s international politics were characterized by a number of different,
and at times, conflicting directives. It was however, this more general leadership abroad under
Félix Roland Moumié that produced, or made possible, the tangible expressions of the politics
of Third World solidarity that the UPC embraced and exploited to its benefit. The network of
scholarships started by Moumié in the late 1950s and then continued by the Revolutionary
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Committee which sent Cameroonian students to Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the
Soviet Union for professional training and higher education is a prime example of this. 69
Moumié negotiated with the governments of India, China, Vietnam, Syria, Morocco and the
USSR to obtain state-sponsored grants for Cameroonian students. 70 It is estimated that up to
one thousand students benefited from this type of aid. 71
The system of scholarships directed by the UPC involved not only the cooperation of
states that had agreed to receive students, but also an elaborate network of intermediary nations
employed to move students from Cameroon to Guinea or Ghana, where the scholarship would
be arranged,

and then again from West Africa to their respective destinations. These

intermediary nations provided refuge to students, and occasionally falsified identification
papers to facilitate travel. 72 Accra became the primary stop for students seeking UPC grants.
By the early 1960s, scholarship candidates awaiting placement were the most numerous among
the various groups of Cameroonian exiles living in the country. In June of 1961 alone, there
were well over one hundred students in Accra waiting to be placed in international
universities. 73 The students formed a small colony in the crowded, working class neighborhood
of Nima on the north side of Accra, where they formed a “Central Committee,” whose
direction reported directly to the UPC leadership in Ghana, and helped coordinate the
application process for educational grants.
The intent of this system of educational exchange, and the conditions for receiving UPC
support to study in the exterior, are disputable. Marthe Moumié maintains that grants were
given to Cameroonians regardless of ethnicity or political tendencies, as a part of an effort to
create qualified professionals and intellectuals so that Cameroon would not have to rely on
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Western expertise in independence. 74 Woungly Massaga notes, however, that the scholarships
were often accompanied by a brief political training carried out by the UPC offices in Ghana,
which encouraged students to UPC branches in their respective countries of study, and taught
the basic principles of political organizing. Massaga does not address the intent of the
endeavor. 75 It is possible that the testimony of both Massaga and Moumié is valid and that
each is describing a different stage in the development of the UPC’s policy, especially given
the fact that Massaga arrived in Accra for the first time almost six months after Félix Roland
Moumié’s death. Bakang ba Tonjé presents an entirely different perspective on the foreign
grants negotiated by Moumié, qualifying the UPC’s educational program as an “attempt to
asphyxiate the government…by depriving it of qualified nationals. [Students were given] the
order not to return to Cameroon to serve the regime at the end of their studies.” 76 Whatever the
intent of the program, ultimately, it did not bring much benefit directly to the party. After
finishing their studies, a great majority of the students sent abroad by the UPC disassociated
from the party, choosing either to return to Cameroon to put their training to use in Ahidjo’s
republic, or remaining abroad. 77

Pan-Africanism in the Metropole: The UPC Comités de Base in France
Although Cameroonian students in France were not the direct recipients of aid from
Afro-Asian cooperation as students studying in the exterior on UPC scholarships were, these
students were essential to the functioning of the UPC in exile. Moreover, Paris was an
important point of contact for young intellectuals from all over the former French Empire,
which produced a kind of Third-World cooperation in the metropole itself. Cameroonians
studying in France were generally funded by the Cameroonian state, or by the French
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government. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the atmosphere in French West and Equatorial
Africa was such that many African students in France were deeply concerned with the futures
of their countries, and followed political events closely from their respective campuses. 78
Under such circumstances, various Pan-African cooperative associations such as the Section
des Etudiants Africains, and the Fédération des Etudiants d’Afrique Noir en France (FEANF),
as well as regionally focused groups such as the Union des Etudiants du Kamerun (UNEK)
became important epicenters of political action. FEANF published a journal entitled L’Etudiant
de L’Afrique Noir, which served as the mouthpiece for the organization, and often published
political editorials exposing the brutality of French colonial policy, and cautioning against the
dangers of neo-colonialism. 79 Outside of the formal framework of these organizations, students
often cooperated by distributing flyers or selling merchandise for local wings of African
nationalist parties. In this capacity, Cameroonians, particularly those who were associated with
the UPC, worked closely with Algerian students, serving as conduits for banned literature, such
as Frantz Fanon’s Year V of the Algerian Revolution. Algerian students were too closely
monitored to distribute the literature themselves, and so relied on a group of Cameroonian and
other African students to sell the books, and then send the proceeds to an anonymous postoffice box opened by the FLN.
In Toulouse in 1955, Osende Afana, then a candidate for his doctoral thesis in
Economics, founded the first UPC regional committee in France. The group founded by Afana
would see various other committees formed in other French cities. 80 The committee in
Toulouse, of which Afana was the president, and the UPC committee in Paris received orders
directly from Cairo, and served as an important liaison between the leadership abroad (then
Ouandié, Kingue and Moumié in Egypt) and Ruben Um Nyobe, who was in hiding in
Cameroon. The UPC leadership would send its correspondence to a post-office box in
78
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Toulouse and the committee would then redirect it to the other party. Joseph Etoundi and
Woungly Massaga, both members of the Paris committee, were responsible for the direction of
special funds coming from Moumié to finance various party activities.81 The UPC committees
also involved themselves heavily in the affairs of African cooperative organizations in France,
with members in the leadership of FEANF at both the national and regional level. In 1956,
Osende Afana became the editor-in-chief of L’Etudiant de L’Afrique Noire, which allowed the
UPC to further intensify its publicity of Cameroon’s liberation struggle. 82
The day after the announcement of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961, four
thousand African students from all over France converged on the Champs Elysées, Paris’ most
famous avenue, to protest the conditions of Lumumba’s death. The spontaneous protest was
peaceful, but was, nevertheless, received by the French government as a kind of affront.
Despite the fact that the African students’ groups did not organize the demonstration, it was on
their shoulders that the accusations of anti-French agitation fell. On February 11, 1961, a
warrant for the arrest and expulsion of four student leaders and UPC members was issued. Jean
Martin Tchaptchet, president of the UPC in France, Michel Ndoh, vice president of FEANF,
Joseph Etoundi, treasurer of the UPC in France, and Woungly Massaga, president of UNEK
were all forced to take refuge in the Ghanaian Embassy in Paris, until FEANF could safely
arrange asylum for the exiles with the embassies that were sympathetic to the UPC cause. 83
Despite the exile of its leaders, the French branch of the UPC remained relatively active
throughout the 1960s. In the 1970s, under the leadership of Woungly Massaga, the branch
would reorganize and become the center of UPC activities, with the support of Manifeste
National pour l’Instauration de la Démocratie (MANIDEM), an auxiliary party created by
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Massaga in 1974. 84 The French branches of the two parties served as the only viable exterior
liaison from the early 1979 until the political liberation instituted in Cameroon in 1992, with
the notable exception of a brief contact with radical opposition parties in Burkina Faso and
Mozambique in 1982. 85

Vaincre ou Mourir: The Third World and the ALNK
Only a few years after Bandung announced the arrival of solidarity as the doctrine of
Third World internationalism, the Afro-Asian bloc had already begun to drift apart on a
number of issues. Among the first and most serious of the schisms that would occur in the
movement had to do with the use of violence as a tool against imperialism. A part of the
movement, including several leaders who would go on to draft the Non-Aligned Movement,
promoted the spirit of cooperation and peace established at Bandung, and developed a position
based on a commitment to non-violence. At the same time however, Pan-Africanism in
particular was beginning to embrace a more militant position, as many movements, the UPC
included, found that colonial powers were not necessarily responsive to non-violent demands.
At a conference of independent African heads of state held in Addis Ababa in 1960, the
Casablanca Group, a United Nations-based coalition of eight progressive African states,
sponsored a resolution that stated its general support of armed struggle as a method for ridding
the Africa of metropolitan control, colonial or neo-colonial. The resolution, which also
included a recommendation for the creation of a special fund to help finance such efforts, was
an implicit approval of the armed struggle being conducted by the UPC in Cameroon and of
other nationalist movements in other parts of the continent. 86 In 1961, seventy-one of the twohundred and fifty political parties represented at the All-Africa People’s Conference in Cairo,
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including the UPC, supported armed struggle as an “indispensable” condition for the liberation
of Africa. 87
Unfortunately for the UPC, the vocal support of the armed struggle it was conducting in
Cameroon would begin to wane before the material support it promised could be realized. As
president, Ahidjo would continue his efforts to liquidate the UPC militarily inside of
Cameroon, and diplomatically at the international level, provoking a detente between the party
and many of its supporters. Once again, as with educational support from the Third World, the
party would have to rely on the diplomatic infrastructure created by Félix Roland Moumié in
the late 1950s. The president’s trips to China, Vietnam and the USSR, as well as his close
relationship with the FLN and the Egyptian government that hosted him, produced a network
of military cooperation that would begin to furnish the party with military assistance in various
forms in 1959 and 1960. 88
The People’s Republic of China began to offer UPC combatants military training
beginning in 1959, providing a two month formation in the use and maintenance of arms,
guerrilla techniques, strategic sabotage, and physical training to UPC members who cycled in
and out of the maquis. The Ghana offices of the UPC served as the intermediaries between the
maquis and the Chinese government. Militants would stay in a special residence in Accra
reserved for combatants going into training, where they were fed and given healthcare. The
secrecy demanded by guerrilla conflict forced trainees to stop again in Ghana upon their return
from China, where they would wait for an ALNK convoy to arrive from Cameroon to bring
them to their post. 89 Over the course of China’s seven-year military cooperation with the party,
such party leaders as Osende Afana, François Fosso, Emock Elang, and Ernest Ouandié would
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pass through Chinese training camps. China also trained female combatants to send back to the
maquis in Cameroon as parachutists. 90
The UPC’s military cooperation with Ghana was limited until 1962, when Woungly
Massaga, a close friend of Nkrumah’s and the UPC’s leader the country after Ouandie’s return
to Cameroon, convinced the Ghanaian president of the need for military training facilities in
the country. Prior to this development, the Ghanaian government allowed the UPC to move
arms and combatants through the country, but did not contribute directly to the party’s armed
struggle. 91 Nkrumah did however, continue Ouandié’s government pension even after he left
Ghana to return to fight in Cameroon’s West Province. 92 Later in the year, military training
camps were created at Mankong and Half Assini, in Ghana’s Eastern Region, which gave
politico-military training to UPC militants and a handful of other nationalist liberation
movements. 93
The UPC’s longstanding relationship with the Algerian FLN would also become a source
of military aid to the party in 1962, when Algeria finally succeeded in driving the French
colonial administration out of Algeria. The UPC opened an informations office in Algiers,
which under President Ben Bella, had opened its doors to any movement interested in fighting
for “real” independence. 94 A number of UPC militants were trained at a camp established in
Sakiet, on the Tunisia-Algeria border, and Algeria agreed to direct arms coming from China
and Czechoslovakia to the struggle in Cameroon. 95
On a trip to Congo-Brazzaville to aid the Congolese “Youth Revolution,” Woungly
Massaga came into contact with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
for the first time. In Brazzaville, Massaga, building on contacts made in Accra, initiated a
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relationship with the movement that would, after internal problems in Ghana and China
severely reduced their ability to aid the UPC, become one of the party’s primary sources of
military support. Massaga finished his duties in Brazzaville, where he was part of a delegation
of Ghanaian military officers, and moved to Cabinda in southern Congo to offer his services to
Augustino Neto, the leader of the MPLA. 96 One year later, in 1965, Massaga settled
permanently in Cabinda in order to try to organize a second front in Cameroon’s maquis
conflict, conducted, like Afana’s effort, from the East of the Country. 97
The history of the eastern front, inclusive of both Massaga’s and Afana’s militias, is one
that is fairly controversial, and whose events are often contested as much by the people who
participated in it as by historians. The specific agendas of each of these two leaders, and the
various theories that surround the fates of their respective guerrilla movements are not salient
in the context of the UPC’s employment of Third World solidarity. What is, however,
important to note is that the opening of the second front, particularly where it concerns
Woungly Massaga and his combatants, is indicative of a change in the UPC’s engagement of
internationalism, or more correctly said, the Third World’s engagement of the UPC.
The years of 1965 and 1966 saw the termination of three of the UPC’s most established
international relationships. In 1965, Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria’s president since the FLN’s
victory in 1962, was deposed by Boumediene, who initiated diplomatic relations and economic
cooperation with the Republic of Cameroon shortly after taking power. 98 This new relationship
made further cooperation between Algeria and the UPC all but impossible. Mounting tensions
between Kwame Nkrumah and his senior military advisors, who were notoriously antagonistic
toward the UPC in Accra, would result in a military coup that ousted the President while he
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was in an airplane traveling to Peking, ending the UPC’s long tenure in Ghana. China too was
unable to offer any kind of consistent support to the UPC’s efforts after 1966. In 1966, Mao
Tse Tung launched the Cultural Revolution, which completely rearranged the social order of
the country, to great economic consequences. While in 1960, the People’s Republic designated
more than 500 million francs for the support of the UPC’s armed struggle, after 1966, support
for the maquis from China would come sparingly, or not at all to the party. 99 To further
complicate things, the network that connected Ouandié and the ALNK in the interior to the
leadership in exile would break down in 1965, completely isolating the two parts of the party
from one another.
Consequently, as Massaga tried to coordinate his attack on Eastern Cameroon
beginning in 1965, he would do it largely without the help of these three countries. Instead, his
efforts to recruit and train militants would bring him into a close partnership with the MPLA
and through the MPLA, the Cuban government. 100 The Caribbean island, which had undergone
a successful socialist revolution in 1959, would step in to fill the void in the UPC’s military aid
left by Algeria, Ghana and China. As a part of Ernesto Guevara’s project of “exporting” the
Cuban revolution, the Cuban government established contact with both the UPC and the
MPLA in the Congo in the mid-1960s. A training camp was established at Cabinda, where two
Cuban military specialists helped train guerrillas for both movements. 101
The UPC sent agents from Cabinda under the guise of traveling watch sellers to recruit
militants in southern Cameroon. Agents would give the new recruits a cursory training while in
Cameroon, after which, they were transported to a secret UPC base in Brazzaville run by
Emock Elang, from where they could be easily moved to Cabinda for training. 102 The office at
Brazzaville was often the staging ground for negotiations with the leadership of the MPLA,
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who had agreed to provide arms to defend the Cabinda camp, as well as military training
equipment. A group of one hundred UPC militants, including two young Gabonese who were
trained to serve as officers, was formed and armed there. Cuba provided the entire column,
named “Ruben Um Nyobe,” with “Kalashnikov 9’s” and several air defense weapons. In 1967,
the column left Cabinda accompanied by the Cuban military officers, crossing the Congo south
to north to install itself on the Cameroonian border, from where it would launch its attacks. 103
Despite the fact that much, if not all, of the UPC’s military activity in the East was
conducted from the Congo, the UPC’s relationship with the Congo was not particularly strong.
In 1966, the Congolese government expelled Afana and his militants into Cameroon after
confiscating their weapons, where they were then captured and killed by Cameroonian military
forces. 104 Under Massaga, the UPC’s installation in the country was tolerated by the
government more because the general disorder caused by the political crisis in the Congo did
not allow it to address their presence, than because it was supportive of the guerrillas’ cause.
Diplomatic and intelligence cooperation between certain parts of the Congolese and Ahidjo’s
government severely hindered UPC’s efforts to infiltrate southern Cameroon throughout much
of the late 1960s. 105 Other Congolese leaders were supporting the UPC, either tacitly or
overtly, even as their colleagues were working with the Cameroonian Republic. This resulted
in a number of multi-lateral conflicts between the UPC, Cameroon, and various Congolese
factions. 106
Massaga’s exile from the Congo in 1969 marks the effective end of both the eastern
guerrilla conflict, and any meaningful interaction between the UPC and the exterior.
Throughout the 1970s the party’s leaders who were still in exile, now completely disassociated
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from one another, took refuge in various progressive countries, with Massaga traveling first to
Cuba, then to Libya, and Ntumazah and others spending time in Eastern Africa. 107

VI. Conclusion
After the failure of the second front, it was clear that Ahidjo had won the diplomatic
battle against the UPC, depriving the party of its international alliances and all of its African
bases of operation. After nine years leading the ALNK sous maquis, Ernest Ouandié was taken
prisoner on August 19, 1970, and executed five months later, after being sentenced to death by
a military tribunal in Yaoundé. 108 With the death of Ouandié, the UPC had also lost its military
battle, and was forced to retreat into an existence that was, for the most part, strictly rhetorical.
The disintegration of what had once been one of the most popular movements in Cameroon’s
history can be attributed to a number of factors, and is explained in great variety of ways.
From an eclectic standpoint, the sheer power of the French imperial machine behind the
territorial administration and later, the Cameroonian state, and the internal organization of the
party, which was characterized by the in-fighting between its different factions that followed
Moumié’s death, combined with the disavowal of the UPC by its international allies to relegate
the party irrelevancy and collapse.
The UPC, a stateless nationalist movement from 1955 onward, was almost entirely
dependent on the solidarity propounded by Third World internationalism for both legitimacy
and material support. This dependency on a movement which was centered around the
interactions of independent states, made the party particularly susceptible to larger currents in
international politics, and it is this susceptibility that makes the study of the UPC’s
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international relations so interesting and so frustrating. In examining the patterns that emerge
in the UPC’s relationship with the Third World, first with the diplomatic efforts of Moumié
and continued by Massaga under the Comité Revolutionnaire, one quickly comes to realize that
the outcome of the UPC’s project was as much a result of international factors that were
completely outside of the party’s control, as it was of the party’s internal or diplomatic actions.
The convergence of a series of tactical diplomatic ruses on the part of Ahidjo, and a global
political climate that was no longer conducive to —or interested in– a Third World solidarity
based in ideology unraveled the diplomatic work that the party’s leadership in exile had done
to win the favor of the Afro-Asian bloc, and pushed the UPC further and further to the margins
of international politics, eventually isolating it altogether.
It is clear that after 1955, the UPC engaged Third World internationalism more out of
practical necessity than an allegiance to the ideology of solidarity. However, the eventual
abandonment of the UPC by its Third World supporters calls into question the viability of the
Third World project more generally, and highlights the fact that all of the Third World
internationalists mobilized the universal “Spirit of Bandung,” at least to a certain degree, in the
service of particular interests.
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Interviews, by alphabetical order and date:
(* preparatory meeting with Yaoundé I researcher)

•

Ekemeyong (veuve Moumié), Marthe, UPC Member. Formal interview. 19
November, 2008. Ebolowa.

•

Fanso, Verkijika G., Historian. Formal interview. 22 November, 2008.
Yaoundé.

•

Kingue, Mbang, Researcher. Informal interview. 24 November, 2008.
Yaoundé.*

•

Kodock, Frédéric Augustin, UPC Secretary General. Informal interview. 24
November, 2008. Yaoundé.

•

Kodock, Frédéric Augustin, UPC Secretary General. Formal interview. 27
November, 2008. Yaoundé.

•

Noon, Théophil, UPC member, MANIDEM member. Formal interview. 21
November, 2008. Yaoundé.

•

Tatsitsa, Jacob, Researcher. Informal interview. 10 October, 2008.
Yaoundé.*

•

Tatsitsa, Jacob, Researcher. Informal interview. 11 November, 2008.
Yaoundé.*

•

Tatsitsa, Jacob, Researcher. Informal interview. 20 November, 2008.
Yaoundé.*
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Appendix I: Glossary of Abbreviations
ALNK : Armée de Libération Nationale du Kamerun
CNO : Comité National d’Organisation
CR : Comité Revolutionnaire
FEANF : Fédération des Etudiants d’Afrique Noire en France
FLN : National Liberation Front
MANIDEM : Manifeste National pour l’Instauration de la Démocratie
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU: Organization for African Unity
PCF: French Communist Party
RDA: Rassemblement Democratique Africain
UDEFEC: Union des Femmes Camerounaises
UN : United Nations
UNEK : Union Nationale des Etudiants du Kamerun
UPC : Union des Populations du Cameroun
USSR : United Soviet Socialist Republic
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Appendix II: Interview Questions
Interview Questions for Marthe MOUMIE
19 Novembre 2008
Ebolowa, Cameroon
1. It seems to me that the UPC had an international vision from its inception. Ruben Um
Nyobe wrote in his “Rapport Présenté au Premier Congrès de l’UPC” :
Before the creation of the UPC, the world was closed for Cameroon, as it
remained ignored by the world…from a political point of view, only the
voice of the administration and the elected officials in favor of colonialism
were able to make themselves heard domestically and internationally.
In other words, the UPC’s mission was two-fold: to project the ills of French
colonialism to the exterior, but also to educate the Cameroonian people, and to
inculcate in them an anti-colonial consciousness that extended beyond the immediate
borders of Cameroon. Could you elaborate a little on the reasons why this
international mission was so important for the UPC?
2. Were there any writers, intellectuals or other political leaders that inspired these
ideas of international solidarity?
3. For the UPC, was international solidarity imagined in terms of race, class, colonial
history, or some combination of these factors?
4. The importance of internationalism and African cooperation is apparent in the official
writings of the party– one sees internationalism come up almost as often as
nationalism. This however, is primarily at the level of theory. How was the UPC’s
philosophy of mutual support in the anti-colonial struggle manifest in the party’s
actions?
5. To what countries did the UPC receive or give support as a part of this
internationalist project? In what forms?
6. The UPC was banned in British Cameroon in 1957, and thirteen party leaders and
members from the office in Kumba were exiled to Khartoum. What were the party’s
activities in the Sudan?
7. From Khartoum, the party moved to Egypt. What were the reasons for this move?
8. Once in Cairo, the exiles were incorporated into the secretariat of the Afro-Asian
Movement. What were the specific activities of the secretariat, and what did the UPC
do for the organization?
9. Was it Nasser’s government or the secretariat that supported political refugees
financially in Egypt? Was the situation similar in other countries?
10. Who else was exiled in Cairo with you at the time? Was there a community of
nationalists from various countries there?
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11. You mentioned in your book that you had experienced racism in Egypt. Do you think
that the problem of racial discrimination had an effect on Afro-Asian cooperation in a
more global sense?
12. What was the relationship between the UPC and the Rassemblement Democratique
Africain (RDA)? What were the specific activities of the UPC in the RDA?
13. When the UPC was expelled from the RDA as a result of the new, more moderate
ideology of Houphouët Boigny and the Rassemblement, what changed for the party?
Did the party feel the loss of the support of the RDA?
14. Who was sent on the UPC’s delegation to the Congrès Mondiale des Partisans des la
Paix in 1952? What were the activities of the UPC in relation to this group?
15. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) of Nkrumah was a point of tension between
the more moderate and radical ideologies of decolonization. How was the UPC
received by the OAU? What was the relationship between Ahidjo and the OAU as a
result of Nrkumah’s support for the UPC and other more radical groups?
16. How did the relationship between the UPC and Ghana develop before the
independence of Ghana? And after?
17. I’d like to return briefly to Egypt; I’ve heard a little about the radio transmissions of
the UPC on Radio le Caire. Can you tell me any more about this?
18. Who was the audience of the radio transmissions? What about the journals that the
party published, like the Voix du Cameroun?
19. What other methods of communication were employed to connect the internal branch
of the UPC to the leaders abroad? What was the relationship between the two levels
of the party? Was information about international actions spread throughout all levels
of national party membership?
20. Ernest Ouandié gave a radio speech in Vietnam, on La Voix de Vietnam in 1958. Were
there other attempts to publicize Cameroon’s independence struggle and build
international solidarity through international public media?
21. Can you tell me a little bit about your relationship with Mme Abolo? What were her
activities with the party?
22. What about Marthe Ouandié and Marguerite Ngoyi?
23. You and your husband traveled extensively during the period of your exile, to Algeria,
Guinea, the Congo, Vietnam, Ghana– all in the general framework of Afro-Asian
cooperation. China was the destination for a number of visits; what type of support
did China give to the UPC to aid its cause?
24. During the anti-colonial period, it was rare to find an anti-colonial movement that did
not have some kind of contact with, or support from Moscow or Beijing. The UPC is
certainly no exception to this rule; the party’s rhetoric has strong Marxist-Leninist
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undertones, and it also received support from the USSR and the People’s Republic of
China. However, the UPC maintained a strict policy of non-alignment, insisting that it
was neither socialist nor anti-socialist. In your opinion, what was the nature of the
relationship between the UPC and the socialist bloc? (Cuba, China, Vietnam, the
USSR)
25. Do you think that the ideological differences between the USSR and China that
complicated the Third World Internationalist movement on a more global scale
affected the UPC’s activities?
26. Conversely, what was the relationship between the UPC and the capitalist world?
27. Is it fair to say that the UPC was really non-aligned?
28. Were other members of the party traveling in the same way? If so, can you give me
some examples?
29. I’m fascinated by the meeting between the UPC women’s organization and Ho Chi
Minh that you describe in your book. Can you tell me a little bit more about what
happened there?
30. How did Vietnam support the UPC?
31. The relationship between Egypt and the UPC seemed to be strong and amicable.
However, I found a document in the National Archives that said that the UPC was
forced to leave the country in 1959. What is the story behind the party’s (supposed)
exile from Egypt?
32. After the UPC left Egypt, did the party maintain a relationship with Nasser’s
government or the secretariat in Cairo?
33. From Egypt, you left for Conakry. Did all thirteen members of the party who had been
in Cairo remain together?
34. Was the integration of Moumié into the government of Sekou Touré an effort to
support the international goals of the UPC (the elimination of colonialism, liberation,
and resisting neo-colonialism), or rather a part of a kind of reciprocity between Touré
and the UPC?
35. Moumié went with a Guinean delegation to the United Nations. Can you describe the
role that Afro-Asian solidarity at the UN played in the struggle of the UPC for the
independence of Cameroon? How did it change after independence, when a proFrance Ahidjo took power?
36. Moumié was invited by Lumumba to help organize youth in the Congo. What was the
relationship between these two leaders?
37. What were Kingue and Ouandie doing after the party left Egypt?
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38. The UPC engaged in military exchange with a number of Third World countries,
sharing guerrilla soldiers and techniques with other anti-colonial struggles. Which
countries received UPC soldiers?
39. Were they armed by the UPC, or by the receiving group?
40. Ndeh Ntumazah, Woungly Massaga and others trained UPC militants as well as other
soldiers. For example, Ntumazah trained UPC soldiers and Massaga traveled all over
the world exchanging guerrilla techniques. What was the goal of these exchanges?
Was it effective? Who financed these exchanges?
41. Speaking of Ndeh, you mentioned that when Boumediene took power in Algeria that
many exiled nationalists had to leave the country, however Ndeh said in his book that
he represented the UPC in Algeria under Boumediene, and that they had a close
relationship. What was the reason for these inconsistencies?
42. In Cairo, Moumié had a meeting with the Egyptian agent Mohamed Fathi al-Dib, who
trained FLN militants in Algeria, in which the two spoke about how Egypt could help
the UPC in this regard. Did anything come of this meeting? What did Egypt do for the
UPC in terms of material support?
43. Can you explain the system of educational exchange directed by the UPC? How were
students chosen to study in other countries? Were there conditions of participation to
study on a UPC directed scholarship? How many students participated? How many
(Which) countries participated? Who financed the scholarships? What were the
benefits of the program to the party?
44. The Third World Internationalism of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement is often
accused of being an elite movement. Was the internationalist project of the UPC
immune to these accusations? What efforts were made to extend the international
vision of the leadership of the party to the level of the people?
45. What was the relationship between Moumié and the French? Was there any attempt to
reconcile the leadership of the UPC with French policy?
46. What measures were taken by Ahidjo to try to integrate the exiled UPC members into
his government?
47. What concrete efforts were made by Ahidjo’s government to hinder the activities of the
UPC at the international level? What was the diplomatic relationship between
Ahidjo’s government and the countries that were pro-UPC?
48. Were there differences between the militants of the UPC in regards to the future of the
party and Cameroon? The UPC sent two delegations to the Afro-Asian Conference in
Algiers in 1964. What effect did the factionalization of the party have in terms of its
national and international activities?
49. Do you think that Third World solidarity was a good strategy for the UPC? What were
the problems? What were the advantages? Is Third World Internationalism still
relevant and important?
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Interview Questions: Théophil NONO
Friday, 21 November 2008
Yaoundé, Cameroun
1. Before we talk politics, it’s important that we know a little bit about who you are.
When and where were you born? Who are your parents? What did you study?
2. That would mean that you experienced the period leading up to Cameroon’s
independence. What effect did these experiences have on your political ideas?
3. How did you become a member of the UPC? What attracted you to the party? What
were your activities with the party?
4. It seems to me that the UPC had an international vision from its inception. The UPC’s
mission was two-fold: to project the ills of French colonialism to the exterior, but also
to educate the Cameroonian people, and to inculcate in them an anti-colonial
consciousness that extended beyond the immediate borders of Cameroon. Could you
elaborate a little on the reasons why this international mission was so important for
the UPC?
5. For the UPC, was international solidarity imagined in terms of race, class, colonial
history, or some combination of these factors?
6. The importance of internationalism and African cooperation is apparent in the official
writings of the party– one sees internationalism come up almost as often as
nationalism. This however, is primarily at the level of theory. How was the UPC’s
philosophy of mutual support in the anti-colonial struggle manifest in the party’s
actions?
7. To what countries did the UPC receive or give support as a part of this
internationalist project? In what forms?
8. After 1957, the UPC was banned in British Cameroon, and party leaders and
members were exiled. This created, in effect, two levels of the party- one operating in
secret inside of Cameroon, and the other carrying out the struggle at an international
level. What was the relationship between these two groups? Was there collaboration?
Was information about the party’s international activities available at all levels of the
UPC’s membership? What methods of communication were used to connect the
interior with the exterior?
9. During the anti-colonial period, it was rare to find an anti-colonial movement that did
not have some kind of contact with, or support from Moscow or Beijing. The UPC is
certainly no exception to this rule; the party’s rhetoric has strong Marxist-Leninist
undertones, and it also received support from the USSR and the People’s Republic of
China. However, the UPC maintained a strict policy of non-alignment, insisting that it
was neither socialist nor anti-socialist. In your opinion, what was the nature of the
relationship between the UPC and the socialist bloc? (Cuba, China, Vietnam, the
USSR)
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10. Um Nyobe made several trips to the UN, and Moumié also represented the UPC with
a Guinean delegation to the United Nations. Can you describe the role that Afro-Asian
solidarity at the UN played in the struggle of the UPC for the independence of
Cameroon? How did it change after independence, when a pro-France Ahidjo took
power?
11. The UPC engaged in military exchange with a number of Third World countries,
sharing guerrilla soldiers and techniques with other anti-colonial struggles. Which
countries received UPC soldiers?
12. Ndeh Ntumazah, Woungly Massaga and others trained UPC militants as well as other
soldiers. For example, Massaga traveled all over the world exchanging guerrilla
techniques. What was the goal of these exchanges? Was it effective? Who financed
these exchanges?
13. Can you explain the system of educational exchange directed by the UPC? How were
students chosen to study in other countries? Were there conditions of participation to
study on a UPC directed scholarship? How many students participated? How many
(Which) countries participated? Who financed the scholarships? What were the
benefits of the program to the party?
14. What was the relationship between Moumié and the French? Was there any attempt to
reconcile the leadership of the UPC with French policy?
15. What measures were taken by Ahidjo to try to integrate the exiled UPC members into
his government?
16. What concrete efforts were made by Ahidjo’s government to hinder the activities of the
UPC at the international level?
17. What was the diplomatic relationship between Ahidjo’s government and the countries
that were pro-UPC?
18. Were there differences between the militants of the UPC in regards to the future of the
party and Cameroon?
19. The UPC sent two delegations to the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in 1964. What
effect did the factionalization of the party have in terms of its national and
international activities?
20. Do you think that Third World solidarity was a good strategy for the UPC? What were
the problems? What were the advantages? Is Third World Internationalism still
relevant and important?
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Interview Questions: Professor V.G. FANSO, University of Yaoundé I
Saturday, November 22, 2008
Yaoundé, Cameroon
1. It seems that the UPC had an international vision from its inception. Ruben
Um Nyobe wrote in his “Rapport Présenté au Premier Congrès de l’UPC” :
Before the creation of the UPC, the world was closed for Cameroon,
as it remained ignored by the world…from a political point of view,
only the voice of the administration and the elected officials in favor of
colonialism were able to make themselves heard domestically and
internationally.
In other words, the UPC’s mission was two-fold: to project the ills of French
colonialism to the exterior, but also to educate the Cameroonian people, and
to inculcate in them an anti-colonial consciousness that extended beyond the
immediate borders of Cameroon. Could you elaborate a little on the reasons
why this international mission was so important for the UPC?
2. Were there any writers, intellectuals or other political leaders that inspired
these ideas of international solidarity?
3. For the UPC, was international solidarity imagined in terms of race, class,
colonial history, or some combination of these factors?
4. The importance of internationalism and African cooperation is apparent in the
official writings of the party– one sees internationalism come up almost as
often as nationalism. This however, is primarily at the level of theory. How
was the UPC’s philosophy of mutual support in the anti-colonial struggle
manifest in the party’s actions?
5. To what countries did the UPC receive or give support as a part of this
internationalist project? In what forms?
6. The UPC was banned from British Cameroon in 1957, and exiled briefly to
Khartoum before leaving for Egypt. Once in Cairo, the exiles were
incorporated into the secretariat of the Afro-Asian Movement. What were the
specific activities of the secretariat, and what did the UPC do for the
organization?
7. In her book, Victime Du Colonialisme Français, Marthe Moumié notes that she
experienced racism during her stay in Cairo. Do you think that the problem of
racial discrimination had an effect on Afro-Asian cooperation in a more global
sense?
8. What was the relationship between the UPC and the Rassemblement
Democratique Africain (RDA)? What were the specific activities of the UPC in
the RDA?
9. When the UPC was expelled from the RDA as a result of the new, more
moderate ideology of Houphouët-Boigny and the Rassemblement, what
changed for the party? Did the party feel the loss of the support of the RDA?
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10. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) of Nkrumah was a point of tension
between the more moderate and radical ideologies of decolonization. How was
the UPC received by the OAU? What was the relationship between Ahidjo and
the OAU as a result of Nrkumah’s support for the UPC and other more radical
groups?
11. Returning briefly to Egypt, I’ve heard a little about the radio transmissions of
the UPC on Radio le Caire. Can you tell me any more about this? Who was the
audience of the radio transmissions? What about the journals that the party
published, like the Voix du Cameroun?
12. What other methods of communication were employed to connect the internal
branch of the UPC to the leaders abroad? What was the relationship between
the two levels of the party? Was information about international actions
spread throughout all levels of national party membership?
13. During the anti-colonial period, it was rare to find an anti-colonial movement
that did not have some kind of contact with, or support from Moscow or
Beijing. The UPC is certainly no exception to this rule; the party’s rhetoric has
strong Marxist-Leninist undertones, and it also received support from the
USSR and the People’s Republic of China. However, the UPC maintained a
strict policy of non-alignment, insisting that it was neither socialist nor antisocialist. In your opinion, what was the nature of the relationship between the
UPC and the socialist bloc? (Cuba, China, Vietnam, the USSR)
14. Do you think that the ideological differences between the USSR and China that
complicated the Third World Internationalist movement on a more global scale
affected the UPC’s activities?
15. The relationship between Egypt and the UPC seemed to be strong and
amicable. However, I found a document in the National Archives that said that
the UPC was forced to leave the country in 1959. What is the story behind the
party’s (supposed) exile from Egypt?
16. Moumié went with a Guinean delegation to the United Nations. Can you
describe the role that Afro-Asian solidarity at the UN played in the struggle of
the UPC for the independence of Cameroon? How did it change after
independence, when a pro-France Ahidjo took power?
17. The UPC engaged in military exchange with a number of Third World
countries, sharing guerrilla soldiers and techniques with other anti-colonial
struggles. Which countries received UPC soldiers?
18. Ndeh Ntumazah, Woungly Massaga and others trained UPC militants as well
as other soldiers. For example, Massaga traveled all over the world
exchanging guerrilla techniques. What was the goal of these exchanges? Was
it effective? Who financed these exchanges?
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19. In Cairo, Moumié had a meeting with the Egyptian agent Mohamed Fathi alDib, who trained FLN militants in Algeria, in which the two spoke about how
Egypt could help the UPC in this regard. Did anything come of this meeting?
What did Egypt do for the UPC in terms of material support?
20. Can you explain the system of educational exchange directed by the UPC?
How were students chosen to study in other countries? Were there conditions
of participation to study on a UPC directed scholarship?
21. How many students participated? How many (Which) countries participated?
22. Who financed the scholarships?
23. What were the benefits of the program to the party?
24. Third World Internationalism of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement is
often accused of being an elite movement. Was the internationalist project of
the UPC immune to these accusations?
25. What efforts were made to extend the international vision of the leadership of
the party to the level of the people?
26. What concrete efforts were made by Ahidjo’s government to hinder the
activities of the UPC at the international level? What was the diplomatic
relationship between Ahidjo’s government and the countries that were proUPC?
27. The UPC sent two delegations to the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in
1964. Were there differences between the militants of the UPC in regards to
the future of the party and Cameroon? What effect did the factionalization of
the party have in terms of its national and international activities?
28. Do you think that Third World solidarity was a good strategy for the UPC?
What were the problems? What were the advantages? Is Third World
Internationalism still relevant and important?
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Interview Questions : Frédéric KODOCK
11- 27-2008
Yaoundé, Cameroon
1. At our last meeting, you described to us your experiences at the University of Poitiers
and the University of Toulouse where you studied beginning in 1955. 1955 was a very
important year in the history of Cameroon- there was the repression in Douala in May
of that year, followed shortly thereafter by the banning of the UPC and the beginning
of the maquis conflict in what was then French Cameroon. Internationally, in April
1955, twenty-nine Asian and African countries met in Bandung, Indonesia, at a
conference that would ultimately become the first formal articulation of the AfroAsian Movement. In November, the FLN launched a protracted struggle against the
French administration in Algeria. Moreover, the world by this point was already
completely submerged in the Cold War. Would you speak to us a little about the
atmosphere among African students in France at the time? How did this confluence of
global and local events at that particular moment effect your politicization as a young
Cameroonian student just beginning his studies abroad? Were there certain writers or
intellectuals that had a particular influence on your political ideas? What did AfroAsian solidarity and the Spirit of Bandung mean for African students? What was
Cameroonian – or African- nationalism for you at the time? What was, in theory or in
practice, the relationship between nationalism and internationalism?
2. It is generally understood that the African students in France were highly organized,
and also very political. They published a journal, “La Voix de l’Afrique Noir” and
cooperated in various organizations. What activities were carried out in order to
support the various independence struggles that were going on at the time, in Algeria,
in Cameroon, and in francophone West Africa? What was the relationship between
different student groups – for example, African students and Asian students?
3. Students were an important component of UPC activities during the independence
struggle. Students funded by the Cameroonian state, like yourself, gave essential
support to the movement, which precipitated the retraction of several students
scholarships, perhaps most notably Osendé Afana. There were also scholarships
secured by Felix-Roland Moumié, the president of the UPC, that sent Cameroonian
students abroad to study in China, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In your opinion
what was the contribution that students made to the UPC’s project? How many
students in France were involved with the UPC? How did the network of scholarships
put in place by Moumié function? Since the party was underground in Cameroon,
could students apply for scholarships from within the country? How did they leave the
country to study abroad? How many students received scholarships? How were
students chosen to receive funding? What was the aim of this network?
4. Can you describe the activities of Osendé Afana during this period? How was the
UPC “comité de base” established in France? How did it work? What were its
responsibilities? How did you communicate with the leaders of the UPC in exile in
Cairo and elsewhere, and with the branch of the party engaged in the maquis conflict?
5. In a more general sense, one of the criticisms leveled against the Afro-Asian
Movement is that it was a movement of elites. Effectively, the leaders of the movement
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failed to extend their internationalist vision to the level of the people they represented.
Do you think that the UPC was immune to these types of criticisms? What was the
nature of the communication between the leaders in the exterior- the internationalistsand the UPC “sous maquis”?

6. I understand that the UPC sent several party members for military training in China
in 1958-1959. After the death of Moumié, what was the relationship between China
and the UPC like? Who was primarily responsible for this relationship? Do you know
how the military training was conducted? What techniques or strategies were
imparted to the militants? How many underwent the training? Were there other
countries that gave similar aid to the UPC? What did countries that were sympathetic
to the UPC do to help them continue their struggle in Cameroon?
7. In 1961, Cameroon became formally independent under the leadership of Ahmadou
Ahidjo. Shortly thereafter, you returned to Cameroon to work with the government as
an economic specialist. How did you make this decision? How were you received by
the government?
8. It seems that Cameroon’s independence under Ahidjo marks the beginning of one
stage of the development of the UPC’s politics and strategy. Another example of such
a change could be the outlawing of the party in 1955. How would you characterize the
evolution of the policy of the UPC from 1948 to 1970, particularly in regards to its
international interactions?
9. Do you think that Afro-Asian solidarity was a good strategy for the UPC? What were
the problems? What were the advantages? Is Afro-Asian still important or relevant?
10. At a certain point in its history, the UPC began to break apart into different factions.
In 1964, the party was even represented by two delegations at the Afro-Asian
Conference in Algiers. What was the effect of this factionalization on the party as
regards its national and international actions?
11. In your opinion, what caused the failure of the UPC’s nationalist project in
Cameroon? Is it possible that this failure is linked in some way to the party’s
international relations?
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Appendix III: Changing Leadership in the UPC
Founding Members (Chez Sierra, Douala, 1948)
Jacques Ngom
Jacques Biboum
Georges Yémi
Guillaume Hônd
Guillaume Bagal
Emmanuel Yapp
Charles Assale
Leonard Bouli
Manga Mado
Moumé Etia
Theodore Ngosse
Raphael Nkoudon
Executive Committee (1948)
President: Félix Roland Moumié
Vice President: Abel Kingue
Vice President: Ernest Ouandié
Secretary General: Ruben Um Nyobe
Treasurer: Innocent Kamsi
Revolutionary Committee (1962)
President: Ernest Ouandié
Vice President: Abel Kingue
Members: Castor Ossende Afana
Michel Ndoh
Njiawue Nicanor
Diye Ndongo
Nguo Woungly Massaga
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